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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY LABOR LAW:
STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN
WORKPLACE CIVILITY RULES THAT
ACCOMMODATE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY OBLIGATIONS AND THE LOSS OF
PROTECTION FOR CONCERTED ACTIVITIES
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
CHRISTINE NEYLON O’BRIEN*
ABSTRACT
Employees who engage in protected concerted activities relating to work generally are shielded from discipline by Section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Where otherwise
protected work-related activity involves profanity or offensive speech
or actions, whether in or out of the workplace, on a picket line, or
on social media, such may violate employer civility rules and/or
equal employment opportunity laws. Important interests are at
stake, including for employers to maintain a safe, discriminationfree workplace; and for employees to exercise their right to communicate about workplace matters. This Article analyzes recent
cases on the question when offensive employee conduct loses NLRA
protection, highlighting the National Labor Relations Board’s
reconsideration and revision of its standards in the General Motors
case, July 2020. The Article analyzes the prior context-dependent
tests applied by the NLRB to assess whether an employee should
lose the protection of the Act, finding these tests more than adequate to balance the important public policies underlying both
the NLRA and equal employment opportunity laws, as well as
employer and employee rights to manage and work in a place
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with a desired level of consideration for others. The Article concludes that the Board’s new application of the forty-year-old
Wright Line standard to these cases increases management rights
and latitude at the expense of hindering employee rights to gather
together to discuss and object to problems in the workplace.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article outlines the current state of the law regarding
conduct that, while otherwise protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,1 nonetheless involves workplace profanity or offensive speech, in person, online, or on a picket line,
that potentially violates employer civility rules and equal employment opportunity laws. The Article considers recent cases on this
important issue, highlighting the National Labor Relations Board’s
own reconsideration of its standards as announced in its call for
amicus briefs in the General Motors2 case, September 2019, and the
NLRB’s 2020 resolution of the GM case.3 The author recommends a
solution that balances the important public policies underlying
both the NLRA and equal employment laws, and employer and
employee rights to manage and work in a place with the desired
level of consideration for others, whether in or out of the workplace and on social media.4

29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018). Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act) guarantees employees
‘the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,’
[as well as the right] to refrain from any or all such activities.
Interfering with employee rights (Section 7 & 8(a)(1)), NLRB, https://www
.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/interfering-employee-rights
-section-7-8a1 [https://perma.cc/C34P-5K6B]. These rights apply to employees
in the private sector whether they are unionized or not. See Employee Rights,
NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/your-rights/employee
-rights [https://perma.cc/4M6B-E3LM]. All employees have rights to engage
in concerted activities with co-workers regarding discussion of wages, hours
and working conditions, as well as concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. See Protected Concerted Activity, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb
/rights-we-protect/our-enforcement-activity/protected-concerted-activity [https://
perma.cc/JB8B-5AXY]. This includes protection from unfair labor practices,
unjust discipline, and so forth. See Interfering with employee rights (Section 7
& 8(a)(1)), supra.
2 Gen. Motors LLC (Gen. Motors II), 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 2–3
(Sept. 5, 2019) (3–1 decision) (throughout this Article, NLRB and Board are
used interchangeably).
3 See infra Section VI.A.
4 See infra Conclusion and Recommendations.
1
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I.A CASE ON POINT: THE D.C. CIRCUIT REMANDS THE
CONSTELLIUM ROLLED PRODS. RAVENSWOOD, LLC, CASE TO THE
NLRB WITH DIRECTIONS TO WEIGH THE TITLE VII EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IMPACTS OF WORKPLACE PROFANITY IN THE
CONTEXT OF NLRA PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY
In an industrial setting where the use of profane and vulgar language was common among employees and supervisors alike,
a union represented a group of employees.5 When the long-term
collective bargaining agreement expired, the union and the company failed to reach an agreement on a new policy for the assignment of overtime.6 In light of this impasse, the employer
unilaterally implemented a new policy where employees would sign
up for overtime seven days in advance and be subject to discipline
for failure to work the overtime.7 The prior system involved soliciting employees in person or by telephone with no discipline
for failure to work scheduled overtime, a much more employeefriendly system.8
In reaction to Constellium’s implementation of this new
policy, the union filed unfair labor practice charges at the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and more than fifty employees filed grievances.9 In addition, numerous employees engaged
in a boycott of overtime work.10 Employee Jack Williams wrote
‘whore board’ on the posted overtime signup sheet the evening
before it would be taken down for the week, insinuating that those
who signed up for overtime were loyal to the employer and not the
union.11 It was notable that employees and supervisors often called
the overtime signup sheet the ‘whore board’ before Williams wrote
that name on the top of the sheet.12 However, Williams’ action

5 Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood, LLC., 366 N.L.R.B. No. 131, slip
op. at 1–2 (July 24, 2018), reh’g denied, 2018 WL 5128410 (Oct. 17, 2018). The
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals granted Constellium’s petition
for review, and in its decision, the court remanded the case to the NLRB for
proceedings consistent with its opinion. See Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood, LLC v. NLRB, 945 F.3d 546, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (2–1 decision).
6 Constellium, 366 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 1.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 2.
12 Id.
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resulted in a five-day suspension followed by his termination.13
The question in the Constellium case is whether Williams’ action
merited termination, or if it was protected concerted activity
within the meaning of Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).14
At the Constellium facility, despite a general laxity toward
profane and vulgar language in the workplace, the employer cited
the following reason for suspending and subsequently firing employee Williams: he was “willfully and deliberately engaging in
insulting and harassing conduct.”15 The Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) ruled there was no unfair labor practice, reasoning
the employee was not engaged in the course of protected concerted activity relating to the overtime boycott.16 He found that
although the employee communicated a group concern about the
unilateral implementation of the new overtime policy, his written
expression could not be protected by the Act because it constituted vandalism.17
Thereafter, the NLRB engaged in an analysis, first considering whether the employee was engaged in a course of protected
activity. The agency found that in writing “whore board,” “Williams
was engaged in a continuing course of protected activity....”18 Next,
the NLRB wrote that “the remaining question is whether [the employee’s] conduct cost him the protection of the Act.”19 “[W]hether
pursuant to Atlantic Steel Co. or, alternatively, a totality-of-thecircumstances test,” the Board found that Williams’ conduct did
not lose the Act’s protection.20
First, the Board weighed the Atlantic Steel factors.21 Specifically, the Board applied the facts in Constellium to each of the four

13 Id. An arbitrator found the discipline excessive, ordering Williams’ reinstated but without backpay. See id. at 10.
14 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018).
15 Constellium, 366 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 2.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 3.
20 Id. at 1.
21 Id. at 3. The Atlantic Steel factors are: “(1) location; (2) subject matter; (3)
the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any
way, provoked by the employer’s unfair labor practice....” Id. After conducting
its analysis, the Board ruled the employee’s conduct did not lose the protection of
the Act. Id. (citing Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979)).
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factors: as to 1) location: while in a high-profile location, the signup
sheets were temporary; there was no evidence this activity disrupted the workplace, and thus the Board found “this factor is
neutral, or leaning marginally in favor of loss of protection”;22 as
to 2) subject matter: the Board found it was clear from proximity
in time and location that the employee was protesting the
change to overtime policy, and thus “this factor strongly favored
continued protection”;23 as to 3) the nature of the employee’s
outburst: the Board saw this as a one-time incident that was
spontaneous, and thus this favored continued protection;24 as to
4) whether the employee’s conduct was provoked by an employer
unfair labor practice (ULP): the Board found that the unilateral
overtime policy implementation was actually not a ULP, the
employer’s act precipitated the labor dispute and the union’s filing a ULP charge as well as the many grievances filed, led the
employee to reasonably believe that the new policy was a ULP.25
The Board ruled that the provocation factor was neutral.26 After
summing up the application of the facts to the four Atlantic Steel
factors, the Board concluded that Williams did not lose the protection of the Act and the employer committed a ULP.27
The employer, Constellium, suggested the alternative “totality-of-the-circumstances” test should apply because the “conduct
did not occur during a workplace discussion with management.”28 Applying that test, the Board still found the employer
discipline of Williams unlawful because the employee misconduct was not “so egregious as to lose the protection of the Act.”29
The Board referred to the dissent’s objection that the majority
did not adequately consider arguments regarding the infringement of employer’s property rights that occurred when Williams
defaced the overtime list with graffiti.30 The Board majority reasoned that both precedent and its analysis accounted for those

Id.
Id. at 4.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 5.
29 Id. (citing Consumers Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1986)).
30 Id. at 5 (referencing Member Emanuel’s dissent).
22
23
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concerns and concluded that the balance of interests relating to
Section 7 rights of the employee and the employer’s property rights
still favored the employee.31 Constellium filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board’s decision and order, and in an unpublished opinion, the NLRB denied Constellium’s motion.32
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals granted
the employer’s petition for review and the Board’s application to
enforce its order.33 The three-member panel found “[t]he Board’s
decision was based upon substantial evidence and did not impermissibly depart from precedent without explanation.”34 Under the deferential standard of review used for agency decisions,
the court was bound to “uphold[ ] the decision of the Board unless it was arbitrary or capricious or contrary to law.”35
Constellium raised another issue on appeal, that “the Board
ignored the Company’s obligations under federal and state antidiscrimination laws to maintain a harassment-free workplace.”36
Rather than respond to the argument, the Board simply replied
that the appeals court lacked jurisdiction to consider its argument because the Company did not timely raise its objection.37
The Court of Appeals disagreed, citing four specific instances in
the record where the employer raised this concern during proceedings, and therefore the appeals court deemed the employer
adequately “put the Board on notice that the issue might be pursued on appeal.”38 Because the Board did not respond to the
merits of Constellium’s argument that a failure to discipline an
employee for defacing company property could create liability

See id. See also Braden Campbell, Worker’s ‘Arguably Vulgar’ Writing
Protected, NLRB Says, LAW360 (July 25, 2018, 6:34 PM), https://www.law360
.com/articles/1066925/worker-s-arguably-vulgar-writing-protected-nlrb-says
[https://perma.cc/N6X5-64CF] (discussing the Constellium Board’s majority
and dissenting opinions).
32 Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood, LLC, 2018 WL 5128410, 1
(N.L.R.B. 2018).
33 Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood, LLC v. N.L.R.B., 945 F.3d 546,
548–49 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
34 Id. at 548.
35 Id. at 550 (quoting Oak Harbor Freight Lines, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 855 F.3d
436, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
36 Id. at 551.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 551–52.
31
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under equal employment opportunity law, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that it had “no choice but to remand the matter
for the agency to address the issue in the first instance.”39 The
court noted that where the NLRA “conflict[s] with another federal statute, the Board cannot ignore” it.40
Thus, on the final day of 2019, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit unanimously remanded
the Constellium case to the NLRB to consider the impact of the
employer’s duty to comply with equal employment opportunity
laws at the federal and state level and any potential conflict with
the NLRA.41 The Board’s failure to address the merits of Constellium’s equal employment opportunity arguments necessitated the
court’s remand.42 The next section addresses the NLRB’s efforts
to seek feedback regarding the same issue in another recent case
involving offensive workplace speech,43 General Motors.44
II.THE PIVOTAL CASE: THE NLRB CALLS FOR INPUT BEYOND THE
FACE-TO-FACE FACTS OF THE GENERAL MOTORS CASE INVOLVING
PROFANITY IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHERWISE PROTECTED ACTIVITY,
SIDESTEPPING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT RULEMAKING
In September 2019, a Board majority solicited input on
another workplace profanity case, General Motors LLC.45 The

Id. at 552.
40 Id. at 551 (quoting Can-Am Plumbing, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 321 F.3d 145, 153–
54 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); see also Consol. Comms., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 837 F.3d 1, 20–21
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (Millett, J., concurring).
41 Constellium Rolled Prods., 945 F.3d at 552. See Vin Gurrieri, DC Circ.
Tells NLRB to Assess ‘Conflict’ in Labor, EEO Laws, LAW360 (Jan. 2, 2020,
7:43 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1230784/dc-circ-tells-nlrb-to-assess
-conflict-in-labor-eeo-laws [https://perma.cc/6QLH-9FDK] (noting D.C. Circuit
shined “an appellate spotlight on a ‘potential conflict’ in employment statutes
that the NLRB recently moved to address.”).
42 Constellium Rolled Prods., 945 F.3d at 552.
43 See infra Part II.
44 Gen. Motors II, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 1–2 (Sept. 5, 2019) (3–1
decision).
45 Id. Then-member McFerran objected to the majority’s broad notice and
called for input regarding revisiting the standards in past decisions not implicated on the facts in General Motors. See id. at 4. She advocated rulemaking as a
more appropriate procedure for such reconsideration, noting that federal courts
had enforced the Board’s decisions in two of the three questioned cases, while
the third went unchallenged. See id. In addition, no federal court has rejected
39
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the Board’s legal approach in these cases. Id. The majority of the NLRB justified its notice and call for briefs as it was:
[m]indful of ... criticism ... [for NLRB workplace protections of
profane, racially or sexually offensive language as morally
unacceptable and inconsistent with other workplace laws],
[and thus the Board invited] the parties and interested amici to
file briefs to aid the Board in reconsidering the standards for
determining whether profane outbursts and offensive statements
of a racial or sexual nature, made in the course of otherwise protected activity, lose the employee who utters them the protection
of the Act. The Board asks the parties and amici to address
either some or all of the following questions, as they see fit.
1. Under what circumstances should profane language or sexually or racially offensive speech lose the protection of the
Act? In Plaza Auto, although the nature of Aguirre’s outburst
weighed against protection, the Board found that the other three
Atlantic Steel factors favored protection, and it concluded that
Aguirre retained the Act’s protection. And although the Plaza
Auto majority did not say that the nature of the outburst
could never result in loss of protection where the other three
factors tilt the other way, it also did not say that it ever could.
Are there circumstances under which the “nature of the employee’s outburst” factor should be dispositive as to loss of
protection, regardless of the remaining Atlantic Steel factors?
Why or why not?
2. The Board has held that employees must be granted some
leeway when engaged in Section 7 activity because “[t]he protections Section 7 affords would be meaningless were we not
to take into account the realities of industrial life and the fact
that disputes over wages, hours, and working conditions are
among the disputes most likely to engender ill feelings and
strong responses.” Consumers Power Co., 282 NLRB 130, 132
(1986). To what extent should this principle remain applicable
with respect to profanity or language that is offensive to others on the basis of race or sex?
3. In determining whether an employee’s outburst is unprotected, the Board has considered the norms of the workplace,
particularly whether profanity is commonplace and tolerated.
See, e.g., Traverse City Osteopathic Hospital, 260 NLRB 1061
(1982). Should the Board continue to do so? If the norms of
the workplace are relevant, should the Board consider employer work rules, such as those that prohibit profanity, bullying, or uncivil behavior?
4. Should the Board adhere to, modify, or abandon the standard
the Board applied in, e.g., Cooper Tire, supra, Airo Die Casting,
347 NLRB 810 (2006), Nickell Moulding, 317 NLRB 826 (1995),
enf. denied sub nom. NMC Finishing v. NLRB, 101 F.3d 528 (8th
Cir. 1996), and Calliope Designs, 297 NLRB 510 (1989), to the
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General Motors case involved an employee named Charles Robinson
who served as a union committee person, and a delegate on the
Union’s international constitution.46 Robinson represented bargaining unit members in meetings with management on contract
issues, discipline, and bargaining relating to terms and conditions of employment.47 Robinson directed a profane outburst at
his supervisor while Robinson served as a union representative,
discussing overtime pay sought for required additional training.48 During their meeting, Robinson got physically close to the
supervisor and engaged in a heated discussion overheard by
other employees outside the meeting room.49 Robinson said,
“You don’t run this. I do. And if you want to play ... this fucking
game, we’ll play this fucking game.”50 Further, Robinson said
“[f]uck you, and you can shove cross-training up your fuckin’
ass.”51 Robinson received a suspension for the rest of his shift
plus three days.52 While Robinson engaged in concerted activity
that was protected under the NLRA, the question remained
whether his language and manner were egregiously offensive
such that he lost the Act’s protection.53

extent it permitted a finding in those cases that radically or
sexually offensive language on a picket line did not lose the
protection of the Act? To what extent, if any, should the Board
continue to consider context—e.g., picket-line setting—when
determining whether racially or sexually offensive language
loses the Act’s protection? What other factors, if any, should
the Board deem relevant to that determination? Should the
use of such language compel a finding of loss of protection?
Why or why not?
5. What relevance should the Board accord to antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII in determining whether an employee’s statements lose the protection of the Act? How should
the Board accommodate both the employers’ duty to comply
with such laws and its own duty to protect employees in exercising the Section 7 rights?
Id. at 2–3.
46 Gen. Motors v. Robinson (Gen Motors I), 14-CA-197985, JD-59-18, slip
op. at 2 (NLRB Div. of Judges Sept. 18, 2018).
47 Id. at 2.
48 Id. at 3.
49 Id. at 4.
50 Id. at 5.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 6.
53 Id. at 1.
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Upon his return to work after the initial suspension, Robinson attended a meeting about subcontracting out some work.54
In response to Robinson’s questions about work, hours, and
shifts for the bargaining unit employees, the supervisor told him
not to worry and warned that Robinson was “getting too loud.”55
Robinson requested documentation regarding costs that he had
previously requested by email and the supervisor told Robinson
he felt intimidated, and that Robinson was “acting unprofessional.”56 After the supervisor requested Robinson to again lower
his voice, Robinson replied, “Yes, Master, Sir. Yes, Master, Sir.”57
Robinson received notice of another disciplinary action, and he
then filed grievances relating to this second round of discipline.58
After management discussions with Robinson on the desire to move from a one to a two-shift schedule, Robinson provided feedback that “these moves are going to be messed up”59 and
“[i]t’s going to create chaos on the floor.”60 Some meeting participants were unclear whether Robinson’s statements were more of
an opinion or a threat.61 At some point during a meeting with
several managers, Robinson’s phone played music including that
by Public Enemy, “Straight out of Compton,” “Fuck the Police”
and “Dope Man,” that contained offensive lyrics and words such
as “N****r,” “Fuck the police” and other profanity.62 Supervisors
maintained the music was loud, obscene, threatening, and disruptive.63 During a disciplinary meeting, Robinson replied that

Id. at 7.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 7–8.
57 Id. at 8. Robinson stated that he told management he is a Black man
and that Black men talk with authority. Id. at 9 n.15.
58 Id. at 10.
59 Id. at 12.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 13. Robinson testified that only one song played, namely the relatively innocuous country tune, “Friends in Low Places,” sung by Garth Brooks. Id.
The ALJ credited the management witnesses over Robinson’s testimony regarding
the music Robinson played on his phone that contained objectionable words.
Id. at 16.
63 Id. at 13–14.
54
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such music is acceptable on the work floor because of the auto
plant environment.64 Robinson was once again suspended.65
The ALJ made credibility findings in favor of management witnesses over Robinson’s own testimony, failing to believe
Robinson’s testimony “that he never threatened [his supervisor].”66 Since Robinson’s discipline on all three occasions occurred
solely for his conduct during meetings with management officials, the ALJ announced the appropriate analysis as whether
his conduct in those meetings was initially protected under the
Act and, if so, whether he ultimately forfeited that protection.67
The ALJ utilized the NLRB’s Atlantic Steel Co.68 analytical
framework that “allows the Board to balance employees’ rights
with the employer’s interest in maintaining workplace order and
discipline.”69 The four factors considered in the Atlantic Steel
balancing test are: “1) the location of the discussion; 2) the subject matter of the discussion; 3) the nature of the employees’
outburst; and 4) whether the outburst was provoked by the employer’s unfair labor practices.”70 The ALJ in General Motors applied these four factors to each of the three incidents for which
Robinson was disciplined to determine if the employer committed an unfair labor practice.71
As to the first incident at the April 11, 2017 meeting, the
ALJ concluded: 1) the location favored protection. Even though the
first meeting occurred on the shop floor, it did not interrupt operations.72 2) The subject matter concerned a work-related disagreement the ALJ determined to have originated in Robinson’s
honest and sincere belief that the supervisor breached a verbal
agreement on overtime coverage with the union.73 Thus, the ALJ
found that the subject matter weighed in favor of protection.74
As to 3), the ALJ found that there is some leeway for impulsive

64

Id. 15. It is noteworthy that the meeting was not on the work floor. Id.

at 2.
Id. at 15.
Id.
67 Id. at 17.
68 Id. (citing Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979)).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 17–25.
72 Id. at 18.
73 Id.
74 Id.
65

66
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behavior when engaged in protected concerted activity, and Robinson was zealously protecting the interests of unit employees.75
It did not exceed the employer’s right to maintain order and respect
in the workplace.76 With respect to the final factor, the ALJ found
that 4) while there was no evidence that the supervisor committed an unfair labor practice, this factor slightly favored protection
based on Robinson’s honest belief that the refusal to pay overtime constituted an unfair labor practice as well as a breach of the
agreement.77 The ALJ held that all four Atlantic Steel factors supported Robinson with respect to his April 11 conduct, and that the
employer committed an unfair labor practice by unlawfully suspending him for directing a profane outburst at a supervisor during
a discussion of work-related matters that were protected activity.78
In the second incident, Robinson met with management on
April 25, 2017, serving in his role as union representative discussing the subcontracting of work.79 Robinson was engaged in
protected activity as the conversation related to collective bargaining issues and its impact on his constituents.80 Once again
applying the Atlantic Steel factors, the ALJ found that: 1) the meeting place is a closed-door room weighed in favor of protection as
it did not disrupt the workforce or interfere with management of
production; 2) the subject matter weighed in favor of protection, as
the conversation involved terms and conditions of employment; 3)
the nature of Robinson’s outburst, calling supervisor Stevens “Master,” indicating that Stevens wanted him to act like a slave, was a
“prolonged side tirade” against Stevens, and “moderately weigh[ed]
against protection” for Robinson;81 and finally, 4) Robinson’s outburst was not provoked by an employer unfair labor practice.82
Thus, the ALJ found that two of four of the factors weighed against
Robinson and he lost the protection of the Act, so that discipline
issued relating to this meeting was not an unfair labor practice.83

Id. at 19.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 21.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 21–22.
81 Id. at 22–23.
82 Id. at 23.
83 Id.
75
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With respect to the third encounter, the ALJ found that
Robinson’s October 17, 2017 meeting with management about
manpower issues involved protected activity in light of the impact of a new classification of jobs, which would affect bargaining unit work and manpower.84 Once again, the meeting was
closed-door and thus, in terms of the Atlantic Steel factors: 1) the
place weighed in favor of protection; 2) the subject matter weighed
in favor of protection, although the ALJ found “questionable”
whether Robinson’s threat and disruptive, offensive music were
protected; 3) the nature of Robinson’s outburst and “overall behavior” at the meeting were “sufficiently opprobrious” that they
weighed against protection, and 4) Robinson’s conduct was not
provoked by an employer unfair labor practice.85 The ALJ found
that with two of the four factors weighing against Robinson, and
with “the nature of the outburst weigh[ing] heavily against protection,” as well as the fourth factor, the employer was justified
in suspending him.86
In light of the above, the ALJ in General Motors ordered
the employer to cease and desist engaging in unfair labor practices and to make Robinson whole with back pay and interest
compounded daily regarding the employer’s April 11 unfair labor
practice of suspending him for protected concerted activity.87
Respondent General Motors filed exceptions to the ALJ’s
decision, requesting in its brief that the NLRB overrule three of
the Board’s earlier decisions regarding when “extremely profane
or racially offensive language” will not cause employees to lose the
NLRA’s protection.88 The Board pondered how much influence
the context of the language or conduct should play, whether the

Id. at 23–24
85 Id. at 24–25.
86 Id. at 25.
87 Id. at 27.
88 Gen. Motors II, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 1–2 (Sept. 5, 2019) (referencing Plaza Auto Ctr., 360 N.L.R.B. 972 (2014) (involving face-to-face activity in work meeting), Pier Sixty LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 505 (2015) (involving
social media posting), enforced, 855 F.3d 115 (2d. Cir. 2017), and Cooper Tire
& Rubber Co., 363 N.L.R.B. 194 (2016) (involving picket line speech), enforced, 866 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2017)). While the Board in General Motors did
not mention it, the Pier Sixty case involved profanity that was sexually offensive.
N.L.R.B. v. Pier Sixty, LLC, 855 F.3d 115, 118 (2d. Cir. 2017).
84
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fact that such language was normal in that workplace should be
relevant, as well as whether the Board should consider antidiscrimination laws in determining if the employee’s language lost
the protection of the Act.89
Member McFerran dissented in General Motors, highlighting
the Board’s responsibility to interpret the Act in the context of
the “‘realities of industrial life [including] the fact that disputes
over wages, hours, and working conditions are among the disputes
most likely to engender ill feelings and strong responses.’”90
McFerran objected to the Board majority’s call for input because
it went well beyond the facts in the instant General Motors case
involving workplace meetings, to reconsider other unrelated contexts such as picket lines and online posts.91 She objected to the
Board’s calling for input in General Motors as seeking “a comprehensive rework of Board precedent outside the circumstances
of the case at hand, [when] rulemaking would be the more appropriate procedure.”92 Alternatively, the Board could consolidate several cases with the varying fact patterns it wished to
address, but she intoned that what the Board did was “impatient” in that it did not wait for these fact patterns to present
themselves, and instead used the General Motors case to “address
issues that are clearly not presented.”93
Member McFerran noted further that the Board uses two
different tests for evaluating picket line and online conduct and
that a third test applies to face-to-face activity, as evidenced in the
instant case.94 She wrote that the Board majority misrepresented
the extent of judicial criticism of the Board’s approach in this area,
noting that no federal court has rejected the Board’s approach or its
specific tests.95 Similarly, she found that the majority’s citation

Gen. Motors II, 368 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 2–3.
90 Id. at 4 (McFerran, M., dissenting) (citing Consumers Power Co., 282
N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1986)).
91 Id. at 4.
92 Id. (citing to Member McFerran’s dissent for the same reason as when the
Board majority pronounced new rules extending beyond the facts of the case
in Boeing Co., 365 N.L.R.B. 154, at 33–34 (2017) (McFerran, M., dissenting).
Id. at 4 n.5.
93 Id. at 4.
94 Id.
95 Id.
89
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to an EEOC Task Force report and its recommendation with respect to the clarification and harmonization of the NLRA and EEO
statutes with respect to the permissible content of workplace civility codes was inapposite.96 Rather than the EEOC objecting to
the NLRB’s rules, Member McFerran noted that the EEOC recognized that broad workplace civility rules could interfere with
protected speech under the NLRA.97 McFerran dissented because
she thought that the Board could and should decide the General
Motors case under existing precedent.98 While the various stakeholders awaited the NLRB’s decision in General Motors after its
receipt of amicus briefs, more such cases involving profanity and
protected concerted activity continued to accumulate.99 In addition, NLRB decisions based upon existing standards continued to
be sustained as long as these decisions were based upon substantial
evidence on the record as a whole, and the agency appropriately
applied the law, as is discussed next.100
III.THE SECOND CIRCUIT ENFORCES THE NLRB’S ORDER TO
REINSTATE FOUR EMPLOYEES WHO REPLIED TO A GROUP EMAIL
CONTAINING PROFANITY THAT CRITIQUED WORKING CONDITIONS
AND MANAGEMENT IN MEXICAN RADIO CORP.
In another case involving email among restaurant employees in New York City, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit issued a summary order denying Mexican Radio’s petition for review, and enforcing the NLRB’s order.101 After the hiring
of a new general manager, four of Mexican Radio’s wait staff

Id. at 4 n.8.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 4. Member McFerran’s term expired in Dec. 16, 2019. She was reappointed as part of a package deal at the end of July, 2020. See Proskauer,
Labor Relations Update, Senate Confirms Pair of Appointees to National Labor Relations Board, July 30, 2020, https://www.laborrelationsupdate.com/un
categorized/senate-confirms-pair-of-appointees-to-national-labor-relations-board/
[https://perma.cc/2XRE-55CX]. See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
99 Rachel Adams Ladeau, NLRB poised to trim protections for offensive comments, N.E. IN-HOUSE (Feb. 27, 2020), https://newenglandinhouse.com/20
20/02/27/nlrb-poised-to-trim-protections-for-offensive-comments/ [https://perma
.cc/Y4X3-K6VH].
100 See Mexican Radio Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 789 Fed. Appx. 261, 266 (2d Cir. 2019).
101 Id. at 262.
96
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lodged complaints with the company’s director of operations regarding the general manager’s disrespectful and demeaning treatment of employees, as well as the unsanitary conditions at the
restaurant.102 When conditions did not improve, the employees
contacted the state Department of Health, angering management.103 Thereafter a bartender/server resigned in an email that
she sent to owners, managers, and certain employees, outlining
the problems at the restaurant and management’s failure to address same, alleging mismanagement, tax fraud, and that the general manager had designs on the porters.104 The email contained
obscenities and included a direction to employees to “stand up
for their rights.”105 The four wait staff replied to all, agreeing
with the email’s author and thereafter were fired over the next
two days.106 The employer cited insubordination, false accusations against management and ownership, as well as use of inappropriate language.107
The ALJ in Mexican Radio determined that the employees
had engaged in NLRA-protected concerted activity when they
supported the resigning employee’s email and that their email
replies were not so opprobrious that they lost the protection of
the Act.108 The ALJ found that the employer violated the Act by
discipline and discharge of the four employees due to their emails
because: they merely agreed to a nonpublic email from a former
employee; did not describe their feelings or animosity toward the
manager; never cursed or made any derogatory comments toward
the managers; the email was part of an ongoing dialogue between
workers and managers; the email did not cause a loss of reputation to the company; and finally, there was no disruption to
business.109 The NLRB upheld the ALJ, while noting one additional employer violation.110
The Second Circuit agreed with the NLRB, finding that
the employees’ activity did not lose protection under either the

Id. at 262–63.
Id. at 263.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 263–65.
110 Id. at 263–64.
102
103
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traditional face-to-face standard of Atlantic Steel or the more
appropriate totality of the circumstances standard applied to social media in Pier Sixty.111 The appellate court reviewed the four
factors from Atlantic Steel, finding, as the NLRB did, that: 1) the
place of discussion factor, a limited email group, weighed in favor
of the employees, 2) the subject matter of the email discussion
involved conditions of employment weighing in favor of protection, 3) the nature of the outburst as illustrated in the employee
replies to the original email illustrated protected statements
with no animosity, cursing, or derogatory comments about management which again weighed in favor of employee protection, 4)
regarding whether an employer unfair labor practice provoked the
emails, there was evidence that the general manager’s response to
employees was threatening, in that he remarked if the employees did not like it at the restaurant, they could look for another
job and leave, and thus the Board found that the emails were
provoked by an unfair labor practice, namely, the implicit threat
of discharge.112 The Second Circuit found that the NLRB “appropriately focused on the [e]mployees’ replies,” rather than the
initial email from the former employee, concluding that the employees did not add to negative or derogatory comments nor did
the employees curse as the initial email did, and that all four Atlantic Steel factors weighed in favor of the employees.113
In light of the examples in the preceding cases,114 where
should employers and the NLRB draw the line on offensive speech

Id. at 264.
Id. at 264–65.
113 Id. at 265. See Braden Campbell, Fired Servers’ Emails Shielded by Labor
Law, 2nd Circ. Says, LAW360 (Oct. 15, 2019, 6:54 PM), https://www.law360
.com/articles/1209461/fired-servers-emails-shielded-by-labor-law-2nd-circ-says
[https://perma.cc/RCN2-N6JP].
114 There are many more cases involving profanity in the context of otherwise NLRA-protected concerted activity, and this issue is not going away. See,
e.g., Alle Processing Corp., 369 N.L.R.B. 52 (2020) (involving NLRB order to reinstate food worker terminated for using profanity and raising his middle finger
at a human resources representative after being pressured to sign union dues
checkoff form he opposed and was legally entitled not to sign); Adam Lidget,
NLRB Tells Food Co. to Rehire Worker Irked by Union Dues, LAW360 (Apr. 3,
2020, 7:32 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1260245/nlrb-tells-food-co-to
-rehire-worker-irked-by-union-dues [https://perma.cc/7DTS-9XYY]; cf. Quicken
Loans, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. 112, 1–2 (2019) (NLRB ruling that worker did not
111
112
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that potentially interferes with equal employment opportunity
rights? To answer this question, the next sections review the
relevant rules that the NLRB laid out regarding employee loss
of protection under the NLRA, as well as analysis of the three
cases that the Board requested comment on115 in the General
Motors appeal.116
IV.BACKGROUND ON THE NLRB STANDARDS
A. The Atlantic Steel117 Standard
The Atlantic Steel case involved an employee’s use of obscenity to a supervisor on the production floor following a question
concerning working conditions.118 When discussing a grievance,
employee Kenneth Chastain used profane language to other employees, for example “motherfucker liar” and/or “lying son of a
bitch” about their supervisor within the hearing of the supervisor.119
The question raised was whether this was protected concerted
activity and thus the discharge an unfair labor practice, or was
it insubordination for which employee Chastain could be fired.120
Under the standard pronounced in Atlantic Steel, whether the
employee crossed that line with opprobrious conduct in the context of otherwise NLRA-protected conduct depends upon several
factors: 1) the place of the discussion, 2) the subject matter of the
discussion, 3) the nature of the employee’s outburst, and 4) whether
the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair
labor practice.121 In Atlantic Steel, the Board upheld the employee’s

engage in protected concerted activity when in a restroom using profanity in
context of bank customer).
115 See infra Part IV.
116 Gen. Motors II, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 5, 2019) (3–1 decision).
117 Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979) (3–0 decision, 1 concurrence).
118 Id. at 814.
119 Id.
120 As the NLRB and an arbitrator before that noted, Chastain’s discharge
was not for one incident. Id. at 816. Rather, his work record was checkered
with thirty-two instances of tardiness, seven unexplained absences, as well as
two prior suspensions and warnings, one involving profanity in front of women,
despite being warned against using such language. Id. at 814.
121 Id. at 816.
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dismissal, finding there was a reasonable basis for his discharge
as his conduct was not covered by NLRA protections.122 Rather,
Chastain’s obscene and insubordinate outburst on the work floor
occurred without provocation and in a context where profanity
“was not normally tolerated.”123 The takeaway from this case is
that the Board’s Atlantic Steel test allows the NLRB to weigh
four very relevant factors to balance when deciding if an employee’s workplace misconduct that is otherwise protected by the
Act, should remain protected, or lose the Act’s protection.124
B. The Lutheran Heritage125 Standard
The Lutheran Heritage NLRB opinion established that
employer civility rules are unlawful if they explicitly restrict activities protected by the NLRA.126 Should the rules be facially
neutral, they still may violate the NLRA if: 1) employees would
reasonably construe the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity; 2) the
rule was written in response to union activity; or 3) the rule was
applied to restrict exercise of Section 7 activity.127
Employer’s facially neutral civility “rules prohibiting ‘abusive
and profane language,’ ‘harassment,’ and ‘verbal, mental and physical abuse’ were lawful because they intended to maintain order
in the employer’s workplace and did not explicitly or implicitly
prohibit Section 7 activity.”128 In considering whether the mere
maintenance of certain work rules violates the NLRA, “the appropriate inquiry is whether the rules would reasonably tend to
chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.”129 The
Board in Lutheran advised further that in determining whether a
challenged rule is unlawful, the Board must “give the rule a reasonable reading.”130 This reasonable reading starts with whether
the rule explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7, in

Id. at 817.
Id.
124 Id. at 816.
125 Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage), 343 N.L.R.B. 646
(2004) (3–2 decision).
126 Id. at 646.
127 Id. at 646–47.
128 Id. at 646.
129 Id. at 654 (citing Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998)).
130 Id. at 646.
122
123
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which case, the Board will find the rule unlawful.131 Absent explicit restriction of activity protected by Section 7, “the violation
is dependent upon a showing of one of the following: 1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section
7 activity; 2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or 3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of
Section 7 rights.”132
In Lutheran, employee Vivian Foreman, a union supporter,
and steward was disciplined for use of profanity and verbally
harassing and abusing a supervisor in front of several co-workers,
and verbally abusing a supervisor by using profanity in reference to her.133 The Board noted that: “[t]he question of whether
particular employee activity involving verbal abuse or profanity
is protected by Section 7 turns on the specific facts of each case.”134
In Members Liebman and Walsh’s partial dissent, they pointed
out that: “[t]he Respondent’s rule prohibiting ‘abusive or profane
language ... directed toward a supervisor’ and its rule prohibiting,
inter alia, ‘verbally ... abusing ... a supervisor’ are ambiguous and
hence overbroad. Neither rule provides specific examples of the
prohibited speech.”135 Nonetheless, the Board found that “in the
instant case, reasonable employees would not read the rule [to
prohibit Section 7 activity].”136
The takeaway from the Board’s 2014 Lutheran Heritage
decision was that many facially neutral work rules could be construed as an impediment to employees’ ability to exercise their
Section 7 rights.137 In subsequent years, the Board’s ‘reasonably
construe’ standard expanded the scope of NLRA-protected activity and invalidated numerous work rules found in employee
handbooks.138 The Board next altered its work rule standard in
this area in 2017, as discussed next.139

Id.
132 Id. at 647.
133 Id. at 655.
134 Id. at 647.
135 Id. at 650 (Liebman, M., and Walsh, M., dissenting in part).
136 Id. at 648.
137 Boeing Co., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 154 (2017).
138 Id. at 2.
139 See infra Section IV.C.
131



190 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:167
C. The Boeing140 Test for Employer Work Rules Overrules the
Lutheran Heritage ‘Reasonably Construe’ Standard for
Evaluating the Legality of Facially Neutral Work Rules
In Boeing Co.,141 the NLRB formulated a new standard to
evaluate facially neutral employment policies. The rule in question at Boeing was a no-camera policy that prohibited employees
from using cameras in the workplace without a valid business need,
as well as an approved permit.142 Maintaining this employer policy,
one of many employer work rules at Boeing, violated the NLRA,
an NLRB ALJ found while applying the Lutheran Heritage ‘reasonably construe’ test.143 Upon Boeing’s appeal to the NLRB, the
Board decided to overrule the Lutheran Heritage ‘reasonable construe’ standard.144 The Board stated that “[p]aradoxically Lutheran
Heritage is too simplistic at the same time it is too difficult to
apply,” and faulted the test’s inability to deal with “the complexities of industrial life.”145 For example, the Board noted that the
ALJ below failed to weigh Boeing’s security need, illustrating
one of the problems with the Lutheran Heritage test.146
Under Boeing, workplace rules that may impact profane
speech and conduct are now sorted into three categories.147 Category 1 rules are generally lawful (for example, the Board majority in Boeing referenced the no-camera rule in the instant
case).148 Category 2 rules warrant individualized scrutiny determining whether the business justification outweighs interference with NLRA rights (for example, civility rules prohibiting
criticism of employer).149 Category 3 rules are per se unlawful
(for example, confidentiality rules prohibiting discussion of wages
and working conditions).150 The Board announced a two-factor

Boeing, 365 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 3.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 2.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 3–4.
148 Id. at 3.
149 Id. at 4.
150 Id.
140
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analysis for assessing the language of facially neutral work rules:
“(i) the nature and extent of the rule’s potential impact on NLRA
rights; and (ii) legitimate justifications associated with the rule.”151
The Board noted that while maintenance of rules may be lawful,
the application of those rules to employees who have engaged in
Section 7 activities may nevertheless violate Section 7 depending on the circumstances.152
Member Pearce dissented in part, criticizing the overturning of 13-year-old precedent in favor of a new analysis, which he
asserted is “[o]verly protective of employer interests and underprotective of employee rights.”153 Member McFerran also dissented
in part to the Board decision in Boeing, finding the majority’s
process “arbitrary and capricious,” and the result “alarmingly
flawed.”154 Member McFerran objected to “secret rulemaking” without notice or comment, and overruling precedent when no party
asked the Board to do such, acting sua sponte in order to install
a new test that “simply fails to address the labor law problem before
the Board: that employees may be chilled from exercising their
statutory rights by overbroad employer rules.”155 As Member
McFerran lamented, the Board majority adopted broad new rules
that went beyond the facts in Boeing, for example, upholding the
lawfulness of civility rules when there was no such rule involved
in the Boeing case, without even asking for briefs from the public.156
The key takeaway from the Boeing decision is that the
NLRB established a new standard balancing test for assessing
loss of protection where workplace rules are facially neutral.157
Rules are presumed lawful so long as employees are unlikely to
interpret them as an impediment to their ability to exercise rights,
as evaluated by a balancing test between employers’ legitimate

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
153 Id. at 23 (Pearce, M., dissenting in part).
154 Id. at 29 (McFerran, M., dissenting in part).
155 Id. at 26–31.
156 Id. at 33. See also Hassan A. Kanu, Labor Board Creates New Standards
for Employers’ Handbooks, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (Dec. 14, 2017), https://
news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/labor-board-creates-new-standards
-for-employers-handbooks [https://perma.cc/Z8PD-C64S] (noting that in Boeing,
“new Republican majority at the labor board did away with limits on employer
handbook rules” left over from 2015 Democrat-controlled board).
157 Boeing, 365 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 15–17.
151
152
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justification for work rules and how the rules adversely impact
NLRA rights.158
The Boeing rule for assessing handbook rules is significantly more employer-friendly than Lutheran Heritage, setting a
renewed priority on employer interests.159 Nonetheless, as EEOC
Commissioner Chai Feldblum outlined the issue to lawyers at
an ABA conference post-Boeing, where an employer civility rule
is used “to punish someone for union activity—guess what?—
that will be a problem.”160 One might note regarding the Board’s
processes for revising policies by overturning precedent, that in
General Motors, at least the NLRB did solicit amicus briefs on
whether the standards illustrated in three Board decisions should
be changed or maintained, unlike the Board in Boeing, which
overruled Lutheran Heritage without requesting any input.161 In
addition, General Motors’ exceptions brief did urge the Board to
overrule Plaza Auto, Pier Sixty, and Cooper Tire,162 and thus, when
the GM Board took the bait, so to speak, at least it was requested
to do so by one of the parties, and not of its own initiative. The
next section analyzes the factual context, rules applied, and outcomes in those three NLRB decisions.163
V.THE 2014–16 TRILOGY OF DECISIONS THAT THE NLRB
CALLED FOR INPUT ON IN GENERAL MOTORS: PLAZA AUTO,
PIER SIXTY, AND COOPER TIRE
A. Plaza Auto Center, Inc.164: The Board Considers Profanity in
the Context of Face-to-Face Protected Concerted Activity (2014)
In a disciplinary meeting with his supervisor, the owner
of the Plaza auto dealership, and the office manager, a salesman

Id.
159 Id. at 2.
160 See Chris Opfer & Robert Iafolla, Harassment in Workplace May Seem
Obvious, Except When It Isn’t, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/harassment-in-workplace-may
-seem-obvious-except-when-it-isnt [https://perma.cc/U32F-KLJB].
161 Gen. Motors II, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 2 (Sept. 5, 2019).
162 Id. at 1.
163 See infra Part V.
164 360 N.L.R.B. 972 (2014) (2–1 decision).
158
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named Nick Aguirre was faulted for “talking a lot of negative
stuff ... [and] asking too many questions,” many of which related
to working conditions and pay, including the computation of commissions.165 Tony Plaza, the employer, twice responded to Aguirre’s
complaints that he could work elsewhere if he did not trust the
employer.166 Aguirre knocked back his chair and replied “[you’re
a] fucking crook,” a “fucking mother fucking,” “an asshole,” and
stated that nobody liked the boss and that if he, Aguirre was
fired, the employer will “regret it.”167 Aguirre was then fired.168
The ALJ found that the employer committed violations of
the Act by inviting the employee to quit after he voiced his protests that were protected under the Act.169 Nonetheless, the judge
found that Aguirre lost the protection of the Act because of his
“belligerent” statements and behavior, including profanity and
menacing conduct.170 Upon appeal, the NLRB applied the standard from Atlantic Steel and analyzed the traditional four factors: 1) the place of the discussion; 2) the subject matter; 3) the
nature of the outburst; and 4) whether the outburst was in any
way provoked by a ULP.171 The NLRB overturned the ALJ’s decision that the obscene and threatening outburst was not protected, and found that the employer violated the Act by firing
Aguirre.172 Upon appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court agreed
with the NLRB’s determination of three of the four factors from
Atlantic Steel but determined that the Board erred in finding
that the nature of the outburst factor weighed in favor of the
salesman.173 The court remanded to the Board to have it “properly
consider whether the nature of Aguirre’s outburst caused him to
forfeit” the protection of the Act.174
On remand from the Ninth Circuit, the NLRB ruled that
Aguirre’s conduct fell short of belligerent, menacing, or physically
aggressive actions that could cause the employee to lose

Id. at 973.
166 Id. at 972–73.
167 Id. at 973.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 972.
172 Id. at 973.
173 Id.
174 Id.
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protection.175 The Board reasoned that Aguirre’s “you’ll regret it”
statement was not an express threat of physical violence, but rather
was ambiguous about consequences, as the pushing of the chair was
not physically aggressive because he needed to move the chair to
leave the small room; he had met with his manager to complain
about terms and conditions of employment; the employer’s interest
in maintaining order was lowered as this was behind a closed door,
and Aguirre was provoked by Plaza’s threat of termination.176
The takeaway from Plaza Auto was that the NLRB, in
balancing the Atlantic Steel factors, allowed that an employee who
exceeded the normal boundaries of conduct on one factor could
be outweighed by the weighting on the other three factors, especially where management provoked the out of boundary outburst.177 Thus, the employee’s conduct, while far from desirable,
was still protected by the Act.178
B. Pier Sixty, LLC.179: The Board Considers Profanity in the
Context of Protected Concerted Activities on the Eve of a Union
Election (2015)
Employees at the Pier Sixty event venue were considering
unionization due to perceived disrespect from supervisors and
management.180 After a supervisor kept servers from talking during
work while on break, a server named Perez used his phone and
posted on Facebook this about a supervisor: “Bob is such a NASTY
MOTHER FUCKER don’t know how to talk to people!!!!!!! Fuck
his mother and his entire fucking family!!!! What a LOSER!!!!!
Vote YES for the UNION!!!!!!!”181 Perez deleted the post after
the union election.182 The Human Resources Director had seen
the post, investigated, and then fired Perez as the posts violated
company policy.183

Id. at 974.
176 Id. at 976–86.
177 Id. at 979.
178 Id.
179 362 N.L.R.B. 505 (2015) (2–1 decision), enforced, 855 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2017).
180 Pier Sixty, 362 N.L.R.B. at 505.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 506.
183 Id.
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While the ALJ found in favor of Perez using the Atlantic
Steel factors, the test used by the NLRB in Pier Sixty to determine if
the employee’s conduct lost the protection of the Act was a “totality
of the circumstances” analysis, which the Board found preferable to
the Atlantic Steel test in light of Perez’s use of social media.184
Factors weighed by the NLRB in Pier Sixty were: 1)
whether the record contained any evidence of respondent’s antiunion hostility, 2) whether the respondent provoked employee’s
conduct, 3) whether employee’s conduct was impulsive or deliberate, 4) the location of employee’s Facebook post, 5) the subject
matter of the post, 6) the nature of the post, 7) whether respondent considered language similar to the post to be offensive, 8)
whether respondent maintained a specific rule prohibiting such
language, 9) whether the discipline imposed was typical of that
imposed for similar violations—or disproportionate to his offense.185 The Board’s analysis of the factors follows:
Factors 1–3: favor the employee.186 Respondent demonstrated hostility toward union activity.187 Factors 4–5: favor the
employee.188 He posted comments alone, on break, outside of the
facility, and did not interrupt the work environment or its relationship with customers.189 Further, the employee’s comments
echoed others’ comments.190 Factors 6–7: “the overwhelming evidence established that, while distasteful, the Respondent tolerated the widespread use of profanity in the workplace, including
the words” that Perez used when referring to McSweeney’s family.191 Thus, the NLRB held that none of these statements caused
Perez to lose the protections of the Act.192
Factors 8–9: Respondent’s “Other Forms of Harassment”
policy that was cited as a basis for his discharge, neither prohibits vulgar or offensive language in general nor did Respondent

Id. at 506 (noting Atlantic Steel factors not well suited to social media
conduct); cf. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 361 N.L.R.B. 308, 310 (2014).
185 Pier Sixty, 362 N.L.R.B. at 506.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 507.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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allege Perez’s comments were directed at any protected classification listed in that policy.193 There had only been five written
warnings for obscene language, and no discharge based solely on
such a claim.194 Thus, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s finding in favor
of Perez.195 Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the appellate court also ruled in favor of Perez, intimating that Perez’s behavior was on the very edge of protection.196
We ... affirm the NLRB’s determination that Pier Sixty violated
Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by discharging Hernan Perez since
Perez’s conduct was not so “opprobrious” as to lose the protection of the NLRA. Our decision rests heavily on the deference
afforded to NLRB factual findings, made following a six-day
bench trial informed by the specific social and cultural context
in this case. We note, however, that Perez’s conduct sits at the
outer-bounds of protected, union-related comments.

The fact that swearing was rampant in the Pier Sixty
work environment clearly aided Perez’s cause in light of the court’s
reference to the “social and cultural context.”198 The fact that a
union election was pending, that management was overtly antiunion, that Perez was pro-union, that the supervisor was discriminating with respect to enforcement of its rules, and that
this unfair treatment provoked Perez all weighed in his favor.199
The takeaway from Pier Sixty is that the NLRB’s “totality
of the circumstances” test is geared to the fact that often the
conduct in question is not all taking place at the worksite.200 Social media is a key means of communication among employees in
the modern world, and abuse of such can be the basis for discipline and discharge.201 Nonetheless, just as with face-to-face
conduct, employees are entitled to express themselves on social
media in the context of protected concerted activity, especially
when provoked by a supervisor.202 The Board will weigh all the

Id. at 507–08.
Id. at 508.
195 Id.
196 N.L.R.B. v. Pier Sixty, LLC, 855 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2017).
197 Id. at 118.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 122–24.
200 Id. at 124–25.
201 Id.
202 Id.
193
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relevant circumstances in order to determine first, if the employee
was engaged in protected activity,203 and then whether the employee’s conduct, in light of the employer’s conduct as well as the
context, means that the employee loses the protection of the Act.204
C. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.205: The Board Considers Racist
Remarks and Profanity in the Context of a Picket Line (2016)
During a work lockout due to stalled employer-union negotiations, nonunion and replacement workers performed the
bargaining unit jobs, crossing over union picket lines.206 Notably, many of those crossing the picket line to replace the strikers
were African American.207 As the replacements walked through
the line, employee Burns yelled: “[g]o home,” “[g]et out of here,” “[g]o
back where you came from.”208 Employee Runion and one other
displayed their middle fingers as the vans with replacement
workers drove past.209 Other picketers yelled, “scab cabs are coming,” “[p]iece of shit,” “[h]ope you get your fucking arm tore off,
bitch!”210 After other vans passed, Runion yelled, “hey, did you
bring enough KFC for everyone?” and yet another striker yelled:
“[g]o back to Africa, you bunch of fucking losers.”211 Thereafter,
Runion purportedly said: “[h]ey, anybody smell that? I smell fried
chicken and watermelon.”212 Runion refuted that he made the last
statements, but the employer concluded that he made them based
upon a video of the picket line where Runion’s mouth was moving at the same time that the remark was heard on the tape.213

See Quicken Loans, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. 112, at 1–2 (2019) (Board overruled ALJ and found terminated broker’s conduct was neither concerted nor
aimed at mutual aid or protection since he was listening to a coworker’s personal gripes and expressing empathy, and none of it was aimed at Quicken’s
policies or practices).
204 Id.
205 Cooper Tire I, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194 (2016), enforced, 866 F.3d 885 (8th
Cir. 2017) (3–0 decision affirming the ALJ decision).
206 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB (Cooper Tire II), 866 F.3d 885, 889
(8th Cir. 2017).
207 Id.
208 Cooper Tire I, 363 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 4.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
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These statements led to the employee’s discharge, and the employer stated the termination was based solely on his racially
charged statements on the picket line.214 The ALJ in Cooper Tire
found that, based upon the evidence, Runion made the remarks
he denied.215 During this same time, Runion also received a citation for jaywalking when he walked across the street against the
light, temporarily impeding progress of another van.216
Cooper Tire maintained a policy prohibiting unlawful harassment based upon race, color, religion, sex, age, or national
origin.217 Its purpose was to outline “the respect to which all Cooper
employees are entitled as human beings; to work in an environment free of all forms of harassment and to be treated with dignity, respect and courtesy.”218 Further, the employer’s policy defined
harassment as “unwelcome comments or conduct relating to race,
color, religion, sex, age or national origin, which fails to respect the
dignity and feelings of any Cooper employee.”219 The Cooper Tire
policy warned violators of discipline, including discharge.220
In Cooper Tire, the NLRB adopted the standard from
Clear Pine Mouldings,221 which held that “serious acts of misconduct” during a strike may disqualify a striker from the Act’s
protection.222 The NLRB in Cooper Tire noted that Clear Pine did
not say that striker misconduct taking the form of verbal threats
unaccompanied by physical acts would never result in loss of protection under the Act.223 The NLRB found that, under the Clear
Pine standard, Runion’s conduct and statements did not tend to
coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act, nor did they raise a reasonable likelihood of an imminent physical confrontation, both of which were hurdles for

Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 4–5.
220 Id. at 5.
221 Id. at 7 (citing Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986)).
222 Id. at 7.
223 Id. at 7.
214
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Runion to clear in order for Runion to retain the Act’s protection
under the Clear Pine standard.224
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the
NLRB Board’s decision in Cooper Tire, with one member of the
panel dissenting.225 The appellate court endorsed the Board’s
use of the Clear Pine standard to determine that Runion’s picket
line conduct did not cause him to lose the protection of the Act,
deferring to the Board’s interpretation that Cooper committed
an unfair labor practice by discharging Runion.226 The majority
noted that Cooper need not have fired Runion for his harassment pursuant to its Title VII obligations, rather, the employer
need only take action to end the harassment.227 While Cooper
Tire thought that the NLRB should have deferred to the arbitrator who found Runion’s statements more serious because they
occurred on the picket line, rather than in a work context, the
court found that such a determination was “inconsistent with
established law.”228 Judge Beam dissented in Cooper Tire, arguing that the arbitrator’s decision was correct and that Runion’s
racial bigotry should not be protected by the NLRA.229
The takeaway from Cooper Tire is that the NLRB will apply
an objective test, outlined in Clear Pine Mouldings, to objectionable conduct on a picket line.230 The Board recognizes that picket
lines involve confrontation between union members and employees,
and that impulsive behavior against non-striking replacements
is expected.231 If the striker’s conduct and statements do not tend
to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of their rights
under the Act, nor raise a reasonable likelihood of an imminent

Id. at 7–8.
Cooper Tire II, 866 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2017).
226 Id. at 891, 893. Nonetheless, the court noted its agreement with Judge
Millett’s concurrence in Consol. Commc’ns, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 1, at 20–24
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (Millett, J., concurring and objecting to Board decisions that
go too far in forbearance of racially degrading conduct in service to employees’
exercise of their statutory rights). Id. at 896.
227 Id. at 892.
228 Id. at 894.
229 Id. at 894–98 (Beam, J., dissenting).
230 Id. at 889.
231 Id. (citing, inter alia, Chicago Typographical Union 16, 151 N.L.R.B.
1666, 1668 (1965) (expecting confrontation); Allied Industrial Workers 289 v.
NLRB, 476 F.2d 868, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting impulsivity to be expected
on picket line)).
224
225
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physical confrontation, the conduct may remain protected by the
NLRA, according to the court in Cooper Tire, following the Board’s
Clear Pine Mouldings test.232
VI.ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE THEN EXISTING RULES
AND THE NLRB’S ANNOUNCEMENT TO APPLY THE WRIGHT LINE
RULE IN GENERAL MOTORS AND THE IMPLICATIONS
In 2017, the then newly appointed233 NLRB General Counsel
Peter B. Robb, issued a Memorandum,234 which provided priorities of the new administration. Specifically, he provided a list of
significant legal issues that, if contained within yet to be decided
cases, must be submitted to the NLRB Division of Advice.235 He
identified those as cases that overruled precedent, involved one
or more dissents, and so forth.236 The General Counsel specifically
cited Cooper Tire and Pier Sixty, writing:
[e]xamples of Board decisions that might support issuance of
complaint, but where we also might want to provide the Board
with an alternative analysis, include: ... Conflicts with other
statutory requirements [(a)] finding racist comments by picketers protected ... because they were not direct threats (Cooper
Tire) ... [and (b)] finding social media postings protected even
though employee’s conduct could violate EEO principles (e.g.,
Pier Sixty).237

Shortly after the GC Memorandum, the standard for addressing facially neutral work rules changed with the Boeing case,
thus allowing employers more leeway to install rules relating to
civility and other legitimate management concerns.238 In a joint

Cooper Tire II, 866 F.3d at 889–90.
233 General Counsel Peter B. Robb was confirmed on Nov. 17, 2017 for a
four-year term. See NLRB, About General Counsel, https://nlrb.gov/bio/gen
eral-counsel [https://perma.cc/M3JF-NAU3].
234 Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the General Counsel, Mandatory
Submissions to Advice, Memorandum GC 18-02 (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www
.employerlaborrelations.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/220/2017/12/GC-18-man
datory-advice.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9AQ-M8KK] [hereinafter GC Memorandum].
235 Id. at 1.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 2–3.
238 Lauren S. Novak, NLRB General Counsel Issues New Guidance for
Workplace Rules, NAT’L L. REV. (June 21, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com
232
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interview with General Counsel Peter Robb, and John Ring, Chairman of the NLRB, the General Counsel once again brought up
the issue of the “perceived conflict ... between the NLRB and the
EEOC’s interpretations of employer civility rules, workplace policies that generally call on employees to be respectful of one another.”239 In particular, the General Counsel focused on Cooper Tire
and noted that he “very much disagrees” with the Board’s decision
in that case, but will continue to follow existing law until he could
“get a case up to the board sometime before too long to let them
opine on that issue.”240 Thus, the General Counsel pronounced that
he was looking for a case to provide an alternative analysis than
that used by the Board in both Pier Sixty and Cooper Tire.241
It is no wonder that the result in Cooper Tire raised the
ire of President Trump’s appointee as General Counsel of the
NLRB, as well as others on the employer side of labor relations.242
Why should employers have to retain employees who make such
insulting, stereotypical, racial remarks that could create liability
for the employer under equal employment opportunity laws?
While Cooper Tire appears to be the case involving the most objectionable statements, in that they are illustrative of employee
racism, a critical fact that differentiates the misconduct in
Cooper Tire from other misconduct cases is that Runion’s remarks took place in the context of an employer lockout.243 Runion
was a locked-out employee walking the picket line, and, after
watching replacement workers safely driven across the line in
vans to do the work, he made the admittedly offensive remarks
that the employer asserted as the reason for his discharge.244
A lockout is a preemptive move by an employer that has
reached an impasse in bargaining with a union, such that it locks
out employees before they have the chance to withhold their labor

/article/nlrb-general-counsel-issues-new-guidance-workplace-rules [https://perma
.cc/VWF7-JY5C].
239 Vin Gurrieri, NLRB Mulling an Expanded Role For Rulemaking In
2019, LAW360, at 4 (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1114155
[https://perma.cc/5CCG-LBYX].
240 Id.
241 Opfer & Iafolla, supra note 160.
242 Vin Gurrieri, DC Circ. Tells NLRB To Assess ‘Conflict’ In Labor, EEO
Laws, LAW360 (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1230784/dc
-circ-tells-nlrb-to-assess-conflict-in-labor-eeo-laws [https://perma.cc/5MAJ-A823].
243 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, at 9 (May 17, 2016).
244 Cooper Tire, 866 F.3d at 889.
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in a strike and thus the employer controls the plan, and replaces
the workers on its own terms.245 While a lockout is not an unfair
labor practice per se, it does indicate that Cooper Tire was willing
to engage in its own economic pressure tactics to defeat the existing bargaining unit’s attempt to make gains through collective
bargaining. Even in a bargaining unit approved a strike, strikers
seek to use their economic power to influence collective bargaining
in their favor.246 They put themselves on the picket line and those
who cross that line to perform the struck work undermine the
efficacy of the strike and the picketers’ position. People crossing
a picket line generally would not expect either respect or gracious
treatment from strikers, because those crossing the line are classified traitors or scabs by the striking employees and the union that
represents them.247 That said, both the union and the employer, in
the context of a labor dispute, retain an obligation to protect equal
employment opportunity rights of both employees and strikers,
including the obligation to prevent a hostile work environment.248
Another factor that protected Runion in Cooper Tire was
the employer’s imposition of discriminatory discipline.249 Runion
was not rehired when the strike was over, but other picketers
who made racially offensive remarks were not discharged like
Runion.250 The NLRB General Counsel noted that another employee who was African American called his supervisor a “dumb
white hillbilly asshole” but his punishment was suspension, not
discharge as in Runion’s case.251 So, despite an employer policy
prohibiting racist remarks, a similar situation involving profanity
and disrespect did not bring the severe discipline imposed on
Runion in Cooper Tire.252 Arguably, Runion’s fried chicken and

See DAVID P. TWOMEY & STEPHANIE GREENE, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT
LAW 790 (16th ed. 2020) (defining lockout as “economic pressure tactic of an
employer during negotiations which consists of withholding of work, and which
also may be an illegal attempt to discourage union activity”).
246 NLRB, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATION ACT 10 (1997).
247 DAVID P. TWOMEY, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW 773 (14th ed. 2010).
248 NLRB, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATION ACT 19 (1997).
249 Cooper Tire I, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, at 5 (May 17, 2016).
250 Id.
251 Id. at 6; see also Christine Neylon O’Brien, I Swear! From Shoptalk to
Social Media: The Top Ten National Labor Relations Board Profanity Cases,
90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 53, at 79–80 (discussing the basis for the ALJ’s Decision
in Cooper Tire).
252 Cooper Tire I, 363 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 6.
245
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watermelon remark to a strikebreaker was less opprobrious than
the “dumb white hillbilly asshole” remark to a supervisor that did
not result in discharge. And, as the appellate court noted, “[w]hile
yelling, Runion’s hands were in his pockets; he made no overt
physical movements or gestures .... [and] [t]here [was] no evidence the replacement workers heard Runion’s statements.”253
Thus, using the second part of the Board’s Clear Pine criteria,
Runion did not raise a reasonable likelihood of imminent confrontation.254 The replacements were well across the picket line
and contained in vans at the time of Runion’s remarks.255
The NLRB stated in Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille that
the Atlantic Steel framework should not apply to “employees’ offduty, offsite” communications because Atlantic Steel “applies to
employee misconduct in the workplace.”256 In Cooper Tire, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit extended this interpretation to disqualify the use of Atlantic Steel’s balancing test to picket
line misconduct, instead allowing the Board’s application of its own
picket line precedents that provide employees more protection
than they “would enjoy in the normal course of employment.”257
The picket line at Cooper Tire was a situation where profanity and slurs occurred and, to some extent, were expected and
tolerated.258 Even if the Atlantic Steel test were applied to Runion’s conduct, albeit with a proviso that the picket line affords
more protection for misconduct than on the work floor, arguably,
Runion’s conduct could still have been protected. On the factors
from Atlantic Steel: 1) the location of the discussion was a picket
line,259 and this factor would weigh in favor of protection for the
conduct, in that picketing is protected concerted activity, and, in
fact, more leeway should be allowed there than on the work floor;260
2) the subject matter of the discussion was somewhat related to
protected concerted activity, i.e., picketing to protest a lockout/strike, and the profane and offensive remarks were directed

Cooper Tire II, 866 F.3d at 889.
Id.
255 Cooper Tire I, 363 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 4.
256 Cooper Tire II, 866 F.3d at 893–94 (citing Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille,
361 N.L.R.B. 32, 34 (2014)).
257 Id. (citing Consol. Comm’ns, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 1, 20–24 (D.C. Cir.
2016)).
258 Id. at 889.
259 Id. at 894.
260 See Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816–17 (1979).
253
254
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at those who were undermining the strike,261 thus one could argue
that this factor weighed in favor of protection because the profanity was designed to discourage strikebreakers and improve the
strikers’ chance of success;262 3) the nature of Runion’s outburst
involved profanity and offensive remarks,263 which would weigh
against protection, however, if profanity was a normal part of
what went on at the picket line, and it related to protected concerted activity, one could argue that on balance, unless the remarks
exceeded the leeway granted to other strikers and strikebreakers, then the nature of the outburst factor would weigh in favor
of protection;264 and regarding 4) whether the outburst was provoked by the employer’s unfair labor practices, one could argue
that the outburst was not provoked by an actual unfair labor
practice, however, it was provoked by employer economic pressure and the presence of replacement workers.265 Thus, this last
factor from Atlantic Steel would weigh against protection. All
things considered, if the Atlantic Steel test were applied to Cooper
Tire, and the Board weighed the four factors, Runion’s conduct
could also be protected, as two factors clearly weigh in his favor,
one arguably weighs in his favor, and only one against, but even
there, there are ameliorating facts.266
This is not to say that the outcome in Cooper Tire, employees swearing at members of a different race or gender, and
alluding to their target’s inborn legally protected characteristics,
was a model scenario. However, just as in Plaza Auto, and Pier
Sixty,267 the social and cultural environment that the employer
creates or tolerates is part of the picture when the Board evaluates if the remarks were so opprobrious as to result in loss of
protection under the NLRA.268
One of Cooper Tires’ arguments was that it had recently been
forced to pay off a harassment claim, and thus it was sensitive to
the need to eliminate racially harassing behavior like Runion’s.269

Cooper Tire I, 866 F.3d at 891.
262 See Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. at 816.
263 Cooper Tire I, 866 F.3d at 890.
264 See Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. at 816–17.
265 Cooper Tire I, 866 F.3d at 889.
266 Id.
267 See Pier Sixty LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 505, 506 (2015).
268 Id. at 506.
269 Cooper Tire I, 866 F.3d at 892.
261
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Notably, the Eighth Circuit found that “Runion’s comments—
even if they had been made in the workplace instead of on the
picket line—did not create a hostile work environment.”270 Employees have the right to engage in protected concerted activity
under the Act, and thus employer restrictions on language on a
picket line should be carefully outlined so as not to infringe on that
activity in a fashion that discriminates based upon union activity.
A straightforward solution to the quandary that employers
find themselves in when trying to prevent violating employees’ labor
law rights where they fear a conflict with equal employment opportunity laws goes back to the application of fair and evenhanded
discipline. A commonsense approach would be to apply traditional
progressive discipline to employees who make or write comments
that infringe on equal employment opportunity rights, even if those
comments might be within the context of otherwise protected activity. An employer could create a policy or work rule that outlines
prohibited words or gestures and outlines progressive discipline
for such violations. In order to eliminate allegations of discriminatory discipline based upon a termination at the first violation,
employers should start with an oral, and then a written warning,
then a suspension if infraction of rules persists, and finally terminate after the individual commits the misconduct one more time
under the last chance rule. A legitimate disciplinary framework
that gives specific examples of what conduct will, or will not, be
tolerated, as well as a series of penalties that are just, would put
all employees on notice of the consequences of making insulting
and degrading remarks that impact protected characteristics.
In a very recent case from the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, Bazemore, a black woman, sued Best Buy because
of a white worker’s “racist and sexually charged joke” in the
presence of a small group of employees at work.271 The company
chose to issue a final written warning to the offending employee
rather than fire her.272 The appellate panel upheld the company’s action, finding that the retail chain store took measures
short of firing the offender to curtail her inappropriate behavior

Id. (citing Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 625 F.3d 1076, 1085 (8th Cir.
2010) (regarding similar comments to Runion’s)).
271 Bazemore v. Best Buy, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 12764, at *1–2 (4th Cir.
April 21, 2020).
272 Id. at *3–4. A final written warning is the last step in Best Buy’s disciplinary process before it fires an employee. Id. at *4–5.
270
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as soon as the company was aware of it.273 The court found that
the unwelcome conduct was not imputable to the employer as
the party who made the remark was a co-worker, not a supervisor
of the complainant, Ms. Bazemore, and the employer acted promptly
to address the issue.274 The appellate court noted, “Title VII does
not prescribe specific action for an employer to take in response
to racial or sexual harassment, or require that the harasser be
fired.”275 The court found that Best Buy took action “reasonably
calculated” to stop the harassment and that the employer had it
within their discretion to decide upon the “exact disciplinary actions.”276 This Best Buy decision did not involve NLRA-protected
concerted activity, but while speaking to the issue of an employer’s duty to prevent a hostile work environment, the court highlighted the disciplinary discretion that employers retain when
responding to potential Title VII violations.277
Legal advisors to businesses frequently choose to err on
the side of preventing equal employment opportunity violations
rather than worrying about potential violations of the NLRA.278
This is because the costs for violations under the NLRA are far
less than the costs of remedies under Title VII, as the latter includes make-whole and punitive damages.279 The GM NLRB majority signaled their intent to reconsider Obama-era decisions in
this area when they sought input in the General Motors case, and
are likely to “make it easier for employers to part ways with workers who make offensive statements.”280 At the time the NLRB

Id. at *1–5.
274 Id. at *8–9.
275 Id. at *9.
276 Id. at *9–12. The court noted that Best Buy’s actions to address the
harassment did in fact end it. Id. at *12.
277 Id. at *12.
278 See Braden Campbell, EEOC Trumps NLRB on Worker Speech Concerns,
LAW360 (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1221470 [https://
perma.cc/3FYZ-QRBE] (citing commentary and a quotation from management
advisor Eric Meyer of FisherBroyles LLP).
279 Id.
280 Id. (quoting Leigh Tyson, from management-side Constangy Brooks
Smith & Prophete LLP). The Board was then comprised of three Republican
members. See The Board, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are
/the-board [https://perma.cc/E5SF-GU26], and Members of the Board Since 1935,
https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 [https://
perma.cc/HT5H-4VLF] (detailing political party affiliations of NLRB members,
273
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sought amicus input in the GM case, it was composed of all Republican appointees for the first time in eighty-five years, as the
Economic Policy Institute pointed out upon the expiration of Democrat Lauren McFerran’s term in December 2019.281 The NLRB’s
current General Counsel, Peter Robb, went on the record that he
“very much disagrees” with the Board’s 2016 Cooper Tire &
Rubber Company decision where the agency ordered the company
to rehire a worker who made racist comments while on a picket
line.282 It was no surprise that the NLRB’s then three-man
Board,283 as prodded by General Counsel Robb, would further restrict profanity and offensive behavior, whether face-to-face, on
social media, or on a picket line. Yet this restriction was not necessary, especially when taking into account the industrial realities
that the U.S. Supreme Court pronounced as the NLRB’s role.284
The NLRB’s choice of the General Motors case for reconsideration of this issue was interesting. It is difficult for an average
observer to find much sympathy for employee/union representative Charles Robinson when reading the facts.285 The NLRB ALJ
did not credit Robinson’s testimony concerning the happenings
leading up to his numerous suspensions and his own conduct at
a management meeting.286 Robinson’s conduct was scornful of
individual supervisors, including profanity directed at one in particular, Stevens, whom he sought to exclude from one meeting.287

including dates of appointment and expiration. Current Chairman Ring, and
Members Emanuel and Kaplan are all Republican appointees). Democratic
Member McFerran’s term expired on Dec. 16, 2019. Member McFerran was
the lone dissenter to the Board majority’s request for feedback in the General
Motors case. Members McFerran and Kaplan were reappointed in late July,
2020. See supra note 98 discussing NLRB membership and reappointments.
281 See Lynn Rhinehart & Celine McNicholas, Three Republican-appointed
white men are now deciding whether you have rights on the job, THE ECON. POL’Y
INST. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.epi.org/blog/three-republican-appointed-white
-men-are-now-deciding-whether-you-have-rights-on-the-job/ [https://perma.cc
/64S5-ESNK].
282 See Gurrieri, supra note 239.
283 Based on the then Republican NLRB composition, there was no possibility of dissent by a Democratic member.
284 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). “The responsibility to
adapt the Act to changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the Board.”
Id. at 266.
285 Id. at 254–56.
286 Gen. Motors II, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 68, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 5, 2019).
287 Id.



208 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:167
While Robinson functioned as a union steward, his role included
engaging in protected concerted activity for the benefit of employees he represented.288
The role of a union steward at GM should not indemnify
Robinson from suspension or even job loss where he egregiously
abused others, including supervisors; instigated disruption in
meetings by playing contentious music laced with profanity and
racially antagonistic remarks, and lied about it under oath at a
hearing; or in other ways sought to unduly interfere with legitimate employer objectives.289 The fourth factor in the Atlantic Steel
test looks to see if there was an unfair labor practice that provoked the employee’s outburst.290 Arguably, since the employer’s
first suspension of Robinson (regarding the April 11th meeting)
was not lawful, as the ALJ later found it was an employer unfair
labor practice, this set the scene for Robinson’s subsequent bad
attitude towards management and may have impacted his misconduct at the April 25th meeting which was proximate in time.291
However, two weeks had passed in the interim before the second
meeting and thus, one might imagine that Robinson would have
calmed down somewhat. The third such meeting that resulted in
Robinson’s third suspension took place on October 6th of the same
year, nearly six months after the first meeting, and thus was not
proximate in time to the unfair labor practice following the April
11th meeting, and the ALJ found that Robinson’s conduct in the
October meeting was not provoked by an unfair labor practice.292
It seemed highly unlikely that Robinson would have any more
luck at the NLRB than he did with the ALJ. The ALJ found that
two of General Motors’ suspensions of Robinson were warranted,
using the Atlantic Steel test and that only the first suspension
involved an unfair labor practice.293 In the first incident, Robinson was representing the interests of bargaining unit members
regarding overtime pay, and the ALJ ruled that Robinson’s conduct was “not as egregious” as that in Plaza Auto, concluding
that Robinson’s outburst did not lose the protection of the Act.294

Id.
Id.
290 Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979).
291 Gen. Motors II, 368 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 1.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id.
288
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A. The General Motors Decision—2020
As this Article went to press, the NLRB decided the General Motors case.295 The three Republican appointees, Chairman
Ring and Members Kaplan and Emanuel, voted unanimously to
discard the NLRB’s three context-related standards for loss of
the NLRA’s protection of concerted activity due to profane and
offensive workplace outbursts, social media posts, and picket
lines.296 The Board held that henceforth all such cases should be
analyzed using the Board’s forty-year-old Wright Line rule.297
This stalwart burden-shifting standard requires the NLRB’s
General Counsel to make a prima facie case that the employee
was engaged in Section 7 activity, which the employer knew about,
and that the employer’s animus to the protected concerted activity
motivated discipline of the employee.298 Thereafter, where the
employer contends the discipline was motivated by the employee’s abusive conduct, the burden shifts to the employer to persuade that the employer would have executed the discipline even
absent the Section 7 activity.299 Further, the Board’s holding in
General Motors starkly declared that “[w]e overrule all pertinent
cases to the extent they are inconsistent with this holding.”300
The Board in General Motors summarized the positions of
various amici and then adopted the position of the Respondent
employer that the Board should drop its setting-specific standards.301 The GM Board criticized those standards, noting that the
Atlantic Steel four-factor analysis of abusive conduct in the course of
otherwise protected workplace conversations has produced inconsistent outcomes.302 The Board objected that the second Atlantic

295 Gen. Motors LLC (Gen. Motors III), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 1
(July 21, 2020).
296 Id.
297 Id. (citing Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980)), NLRB v. Wright
Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982) (approved
in NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983)).
298 Id. at 2 n.9 (citing Tschiggfrie Properties, Ltd., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 120,
slip op. at 6, 8 (2019)).
299 Id. at 2 n.10 (citing Hobson Bearing Int’l, Inc., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 73, slip
op. at 1 n.1 (2017)).
300 Id. at 2. The GM Board repeated this proclamation later in its opinion.
Id. at 9, 9 n.22.
301 Id. at 4.
302 Id. at 6.
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Steel factor, the subject matter of the outburst, always favored
employees since the test only applied when the discussion involved Section 7 activity, and that the Board gave “little, if any,
consideration to [an] employer’s right to maintain order and respect.”303 The GM Board concluded that the Atlantic Steel analysis was not effective, that the Board had not sufficiently explained
the test’s application to various facts, creating an analysis that
serves as “a cloak for agency whim.”304
With respect to the previously adopted totality of the circumstances test for social media posts and coworker discussions,
the GM Board found more flexibility on factors to be considered
than with the Atlantic Steel test, which only leaned itself to the
same problems of inconsistency and unpredictability it noted with
respect to the Atlantic Steel four-factor test.305 Finally, the GM
Board determined that use of the Clear Pine test for picket line misconduct left the bar too low because it only results in loss of NLRA
protection where the conduct involved “an overt or implied threat or
where there is a reasonable likelihood of an imminent physical
confrontation.”306 This test left “appallingly abusive picket-line
misconduct to retain protection, including racially and sexually
offensive language.”307 The GM Board also faulted the settingspecific standards as creating tension with equal employment opportunity laws designed to avoid harm rather than redress it.308
Chairman Ring penned an opinion piece for the Wall Street
Journal one day after the Board issued its decision in General
Motors.309 In justifying the agency’s reversal of “Obama-era
standards that forced employers to reinstate abusive employees,”
the NLRB Chairman noted several comments made on the picket

Id. at 5 (citing NLRB v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 679 F.3d 79, 73–74, 79–80
(2d Cir. 2012) (noting circuit court faulted NLRB for improperly disregarding the
employer’s legitimate concern about employee swearing in front of customers)).
304 Id. at 6 (citing LeMoyne-Owen &ROO v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir.
2004)).
305 Id.
306 Id. at 10.
307 Id. (citing Cooper I, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, slip op. at 7–10 (2016)).
308 Id. at 11 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998)).
309 John F. Ring, NLRB Stops Excusing Workplace Harassment, WALL ST.
J. (July 21, 2020, 3:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nlrb-stops-excusing
-workplace-harassment-11595358659 [https://perma.cc/9DAG-BA7K].
303



2020]

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY LABOR LAW

211

line in Cooper Tire.310 He chose not to clarify that the worst racist statement, “Go back to Africa” was not made by the employee
who was terminated and sought relief under the rights and protections of the NLRA.311 Rather, that comment was part of the
scene.312 The comment actually attributed to that employee was
“I smell fried chicken and watermelon.”313 This racial inference
to diet was clearly less hostile than the former offensive slur
that the employee in question did not make. This does not excuse the latter comment, but it lessened the egregiousness in
that it was singular and less confrontational.
In the same opinion piece, Chairman Ring declared: “the
NLRB is now out of the business of deciding whether bad behavior is ‘bad enough.’”314 Yet the imposition of the Wright Line
standard adopted by the GM Board still requires the Board to
judge just what misconduct is sufficient to provide an employer
defense that the employee would have been fired anyway, absent
the NLRA-protected activity.315 The Chairman cast the GM decision as “an important advancement for civility and respect in
this country’s workplaces.”316 Make no mistake; the GM decision
is also an advancement for management rights to stifle objection
to the status quo. It further restrains employee rights to engage
in protected concerted activity to seek improvement in wages,
hours, and working conditions.317 The decision makes it easier for
employers to parse their need to protect employees from a hostile work environment as a reason to discharge union supporters.318 Interestingly, when Cooper Tire appealed to the Court of

Id.
311 Cooper Tire II, 866 F.3d 885, 895 (8th Cir. 2017).
312 Id.
313 See Ring, supra note 309.
314 Id.
315 Gen. Motors III, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 2 (July 21, 2020).
316 See Ring, supra note 309.
317 Braden Campbell, NLRB Makes it Easier to Fire Workers over Profane
Outbursts, LAW360 (July 21, 2020, 2:32 PM), https://www.law360.com/arti
cles/1294083/nlrb-makes-it-easier-to-fire-workers-over-profane-outbursts [https://
perma.cc/ASB8-27FD] (noting under new standard adopted in General Motors
decision, employer gets a chance to prove it would have fired the worker anyway
even absent the protected conduct).
318 Id.
310
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the court ruled that the employee’s comment/conduct on the picket line did not create a hostile
work environment.319
Perhaps one positive thing about the GM Board’s pronouncement implementing the Wright Line test henceforth is
that it is simpler than having three setting-based tests. That said,
the setting or context should still matter under the Wright Line test.
Where discriminatory discipline occurs in reaction to the exercise of protected concerted activity, this should give rise to an
unfair labor practice finding unless the misconduct was so egregious that the employee would have been fired anyway. The context matters as well as the conduct of all employees and managers,
or replacement workers in the case of a picket line.320 It is the
nature of a picket line that tempers will flare when picketing locked
out employees are confronted with replacement workers crossing
the line to perform what picketers perceive as “their” work. If a
boss is bullying an employee or swearing at him/her, the employee is more likely to retaliate in kind. And if the same occurs on
social media, retorts to derogatory or defamatory remarks from others are likely to be met in kind. The GM Board specifically discounted earlier Board precedent recognizing “that disputes over
wages, hours, and working conditions are among the disputes
most likely to engender ill feelings and strong responses.”321 The
Board in GM wrote that “this rationale is overstated and has
largely swallowed employers’ concomitant right to maintain order,
respect, and a workplace free from invidious discrimination.”322
The GM Board qualified that this perspective was limited to
cases where there was no discriminatory discipline.323
The GM Board objected to the setting-specific standards
because they worried that these standards did not require the
Board to establish anti-union motivation, but rather presumed or
inferred it in the face of discrimination against a union supporter.324
Such discrimination takes the form of harsher discipline imposed

Id. (citing Cooper Tire II, 866 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 2017)).
Gen. Motors LLC (Gen. Motors III), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 19
(July 21, 2020).
321 Id. at 2 (quoting Consumer Power Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 130, 132 (1986)).
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 14.
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on a union supporter than another in similar circumstances. It is
interesting that the Board, in applying the “totality of the circumstances” test in Pier Sixty, set out evidence of employer antiunion activity as the second factor.325 The GM Board discounted
the Board’s earlier pronouncements that “[w]here an employer
defends disciplinary action based on employee conduct that is
part of the res gestae of the employee’s protected activity, Wright
Line is inapplicable.”326 The GM Board disagreed with this, setting out that the causal connection between the protected activity
and the discipline was, in fact, “properly in dispute.”327 In some
respects, it seems that the GM Board feared that with the setting-specific standards, employers might be held to the same standards as employees with respect to profane or offensive conduct.328
They shudder at an employee’s use of profanity towards management in Plaza Auto,329 or NLRB v. Starbucks, 330 a slur at a
strikebreaker in Cooper Tire, 331 but illustrate no similar outrage at
the profanity directed at employees by managers on the eve of a
union election in Pier Sixty.332
In its parting shot, the GM Board decided to apply the
Wright Line standard retroactively to pending cases relating to
abusive conduct in connection with Section 7 protected activity.333
The Board acknowledged that some employees might have acted
in reliance on the prior setting-specific standards and engaged in
conduct [that would no longer be protected] but managed to find
that such “ill effects are outweighed by the potential harm of
producing results contrary to the Act’s principles and potentially

See supra notes 185–99 and accompanying text discussing factors in
Pier Sixty.
326 Gen. Motors III, 369 N.L.R.B., slip op. at 15 (citing Roemer Indus. Inc.,
362 N.L.R.B. 828, 834 n.15 (2015)). The quote from Roemer continued to say:
“This is so because the causal connection between the protected activity and
the discipline is not in dispute.” Id.
327 Id.
328 See id.
329 Id. at 19 n.1 (outlining employee’s profanity at Plaza’s owner over alleged
improper calculation of sales commissions).
330 Id. at 9 (citing NLRB v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 679 F.3d 70, 73–74, 79–80
(2d Cir. 2012)) (concerning off-duty employee swearing at a manager).
331 Id. at 19 n.3.
332 Id. at 19 n.2 (citing only the swearing directed at manager).
333 Id. at 17.
325
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at odds with antidiscrimination law.”334 Once again, the GM Board
leans towards protecting management at the expense of employee rights.335 Thus, cases that are in the pipeline or on remand to
the Board, or to an ALJ, will require reconsideration and likely
development of additional facts under the newly announced and
yet retroactive forty-year-old Wright Line rule.336 It is unlikely
that employees will fare better under the GM Board’s old/new
standard rather than with the prior rules.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There is not unbounded protection on speech and conduct
just because of the Section 7 concerted activity involved.337 This
was never the case.338 There were always limits on NLRA protected acts, and the context of the remarks or conduct should be
part of the Board’s analysis,339 as well as the impact on other

Id. (emphasis added).
335 Id.
336 Id. at 1.
337 Id. at 13.
338 Id. at 12.
339 Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882, slip op. at 1 (Apr. 6, 2020). Chief Justice
Roberts spoke up at President Trump’s impeachment trial before the Senate
on Jan. 22, 2020 about the need for civility amongst advocates in the U.S.
Supreme Court forum:
I think it is appropriate at this point for me to admonish both
the House managers and the president’s counsel in equal terms
to remember that they are addressing the world’s greatest deliberative body. One reason it has earned that title is because
its members avoid speaking in a manner and using language
that is not conducive to civil discourse. In the 1905 Swayne trial,
a senator objected when one of the managers used the word
‘pettifogging,’ [referring to Judge Charles Swayne who was
impeached and later acquitted by the Senate] and the presiding
officer said the word ought not to have been used. I don’t think we
need to aspire to that high a standard, but I do think those addressing the Senate should remember where they are.
NBC News (@NBCNews), TWITTER (Jan. 22, 2020, 12:59 AM), https://twitter
.com/NBCNews/status/1219862246731501568. Further, at the oral argument
for Babb v. Wilkie (Case. No. 18-882) Chief Justice Roberts recently expressed
concern when a plaintiff in an age discrimination case before the Court was
using a hypothetical where an employer said “OK, Boomer” during a job application process, and pondered whether the plaintiff’s position was “going to
become really just a regulation of speech in the workplace.” See Jimmy Hoover,
334
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employees and on employers who are responsible for a workplace free from harassment. Both the union and the employer, in
the context of a labor dispute, retain an obligation to protect equal
employment opportunity rights of both employees and strikers, including the obligation to prevent a hostile work environment.340
In the post-GM labor law world, employers should set up
rules that make clear that there will be progressive discipline for
profanity and offensive conduct that conflicts with employee rights
under equal employment opportunity law. This is necessary for
the good of all, employers, unions, and employees.341 Employers
should not be placed in a catch twenty-two situation where they
are subject to suit for unfair labor practices under the NLRA and
Title VII and other EEO violations that can be pursued by agencies,
unions, and employees.342 Discipline need not be draconian to
achieve the objective of eliminating harassing behavior. It does
not have to mean discharge or even suspension upon the first
offense.343 Progressive discipline works, employees learn what
conduct and language is impermissible, and employer civility rules
can put supervisors on notice what provoking conduct on the part

Roberts Wonders if Workers Can Sue Over ‘OK, Boomer,’ LAW360 (Jan. 15,
2020, 1:30 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1234662/roberts-wonders-if
-workers-can-sue-over-ok-boomer- [https://perma.cc/26WH-3GJA]. Interestingly,
the Supreme Court voted 8–1 in favor of the employee, ruling that he only needed
to prove that age was a motivating factor in order to be able to sue, and eschewed a
‘but for’ standard of causation in cases of discrimination in federal employment
cases. Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882, slip op. at 1 (Apr. 6, 2020). The ‘but for’ cause
would still be required for a remedy. Id. at 14. There are currently a number of
regulations for speech in the workplace built into the language of equal employment opportunity, labor, tort laws relating to workplace violence, defamation,
and trade secret protection, among others. See Lisa Nagele-Piazza, What Employee Speech Is Protected in the Workplace?, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT. (July 23,
2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employ
ment-law/pages/employee-free-speech-in-the-workplace.aspx [https://perma
.cc/8RZE-53B8].
340 See generally supra text accompanying notes 257–70.
341 See supra Part VI.
342 Of course, many employees are subject to mandatory individual arbitration agreements which effectively remove these disputes from the public
forum of an Article III court, in favor of private resolution by arbitrators.
343 See Progressive Discipline Policy—Single Progressive Discipline Policy,
SHRM, https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/policies/pages
/progressivedisciplinepolicy.aspx [https://perma.cc/RGT8-G2UX] (setting out
progressive discipline of oral warning, written warning, suspension with final
written warning and then termination).



216 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:167
of the supervisor could excuse an employee’s profane outburst.344
Regardless of the current NLRB’s excessive concern for management rights, what is good for the employee in terms of limits on
profanity and offensive speech should be good for her boss as well.
Employers could use categories of words, outlined in an
employer manual, if the employer wishes to regulate civility,
much like comedian George Carlin wrote a monologue “Seven
Words You Can Never Say on Television.”345 There is a difference
between rude statements and hate speech. The latter should
have severe consequences, but the former may not even be actionable if emitted by a supervisor to an employee without reference to a protected category such as race or sex, or the like. Some
words no one should have to hear directed at them, especially
when slurs undercut the rights of legally protected groups at
work or on social media and some might argue, even on a picket
line. That said, what should the consequences be for various levels of misconduct in these instances? There is a big difference
between calling an employee a “boomer,” which term admittedly
refers to an ageist stereotype, as opposed to using offensive racist or degrading sexual terms to refer to other employees.
What should the NLRB have done regarding the perceived conflict between federal workplace statutes, the NLRA,
and equal employment opportunity laws? The setting-specific
standards the Board was using were clearly workable and well
known in the human resource and labor law spheres.346 As long
as employers, as well as the Board and its ALJ’s, reference violations of equal employment opportunity as misconduct and
treat it accordingly, and not in a discriminatory fashion that penalizes those who were engaged in protected concerted activity,
the previous NLRB rules produced little or no conflict with EEO
rights.347 The NLRB is entitled to deference in interpreting the
application of the Act to changing industrial patterns. However,

Provocation is a factor in both criminal and civil actions, which works
to mitigate the consequences of assault by the defendant. The NLRB did not
originate this concept in Atlantic Steel but they did place it in a workplace
context under the NLRA.
345 See Seven Dirty Words, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven
_dirty_words [https://perma.cc/89F6-R96W].
346 Gen. Motors III, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 5 (July 21, 2020).
347 Id.
344
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to overturn sound precedent, and for the appellate courts to enforce such orders, the Board must outline rationale for such that
is not arbitrary and capricious. The three Republican appointees
to the Board, in deciding the General Motors case, took it upon
themselves to overrule much sound precedent without adequate
justification.348 To quote former Board Chair Wilma Liebman,
dissenting in the IBM Corp. case, the majority changed the rule
“not because they must, and not because they should, but because they can.” 349 This decision reflects the reality of partisan
politics with unnecessary flip-flopping on standards every time
the political composition of the Board sways.350 There is no dissent in the GM case because the then three-member Board was
all on the employer’s side. The GM Board prides itself with advancing civility in the workplace, but that is not the role of the
NLRB. That is not even the role of the EEOC.351
The bottom line for enforceability of NLRB orders in federal courts should be whether the Board attributed enough
weight to misconduct that clearly violates equal employment opportunity laws when determining if the misconduct exceeds the
protection of the Act. Misconduct that violates equal employment
opportunity laws should have more severe consequences than profanity that is the equivalent of toilet or bathroom talk. At the
same time, minor violations of civility rules that impinge upon equal
employment opportunity amongst coworkers should be sanctioned
in accordance with their severity. Standards for progressive discipline should be transparent and imposed in a nondiscriminatory
manner. The right of employees to engage in concerted activities,
including picketing for higher wages and better working conditions,
and employee rights to be free from racial and sexual harassment,
among others, must be balanced equitably in order for the important public policies behind the federal labor and employment

348 Lynn Rhinehart and Celine McNicholas, Three Republican-appointed
white men are now deciding whether you have rights on the job, ECON. POL, INST.
(Dec. 17, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/three-republican-appointed
-white-men-are-now-deciding-whether-you-have-rights-on-the-job/
[https://
perma.cc/VN8S-KM3F].
349 IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, at 1311 (2004) (Liebman, J., dissenting).
350 See supra text accompanying notes 281–84.
351 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998) (noting Title
VII is not a general civility code for the American workplace).
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law statutes to be effectuated.352 As opponents to the NLRB’s
prior stance on this matter have noted, the NLRB should not act
with blinders on regarding other statutes that may conflict with
its rules.353 Just as arbitrators have been required to interpret
equal employment laws within labor disputes,354 so too should
the NLRB read the NLRA in a broader context to prevent labor
law from infringing upon equal employment opportunity laws.


See generally Interfering with employee rights (Section 7 & 8(a)(1)), NLRB,
https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/the-law/interfering-with-em
ployee-rights-section-7-8a1 [https://perma.cc/MZ3A-8AHG].
353 Gen. Motors III, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 127, slip op. at 2 (July 21, 2020).
354 See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
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